In conventional accounting literature, ‗transfer pricing' is portrayed as a technique for optimal allocation of costs and revenues amongst divisions, subsidiaries and joint ventures within a group of related entities. Such representations of transfer pricing simultaneously acknowledge and occlude how it is deeply implicated in processes of wealth retentiveness that enable companies to avoid taxes and facilitate the flight of capital. A purely technical conception of transfer pricing calculations abstracts them from the politico-economic contexts of their development and use. The context is the modern corporation in an era of globalized trade and its relationship to state tax authorities, shareholders and other possible stakeholders. Transfer pricing practices are responsive to opportunities for determining values in ways that are consequential for enhancing private gains, and thereby contributing to relative social impoverishment, by avoiding the payment of public taxes. Evidence is provided by examining some of the transfer prices practices used by corporations to avoid taxes in developing and developed economies. Institution has argued that -transfer pricing is used by virtually every multinational corporation to shift profits at will around the globe‖ (Baker, 2005, p. 30).
that it can levy upon corporate profits to finance public goods and thereby secure legitimacy.
Business advisers claim that -transfer pricing continues to be, and will remain, the most important international tax issue facing MNEs‖ (Ernst & Young, 2006, p. 5) . This is entirely plausible because transfer pricing enables corporations to minimize tax payments by enabling capital to be exported to more favourable locations. It has become a major growth area for international accountancy firms which market -creative and practical solutions for … transfer pricing needs‖ (Ernst & Young, 2005, p. 68) . Given the importance of transfer pricing in relocating corporate profits, facilitating tax avoidance and the flight of capital, and its implications for the distribution of wealth and public goods (US General Accounting Office, 1995; Armstrong, 1998; Oyelere and Emmanuel, 1998; Gramlich and Wheeler, 2003; Baker, 2005 ; UK Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006) , the Head of the US Inland Revenue Service (IRS) has described transfer pricing as -one of [its] most significant challenges‖ (The Times, 12 September 2006) . Arguably, there is significantly more to transfer pricing than refinements of techniques and a study of US corporations concluded that -transfer pricing may be playing an important role in aggregate national accounting, potentially reducing the reported value of exports and the current account (and thus GDP). The response of the price wedge to tax rates indicates that tax minimization may be an important part of transfer pricing decisions with consequences for the level of corporate tax revenue and strategic responses to changes in the tax code‖ (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006, pp. 19-20) .
With the intensification of globalization, nation-states have become concerned about the malleability of ‗transfer prices' and their role in avoiding taxes and knock on effect for public legitimacy and citizens' life-chances. Some have taken considerable powers to challenge corporate calculations. For example, the US tax authorities have considerable powers under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code to allocate income, deductions, credits, or other allowances between or among controlled entities if that allocation is considered to be necessary to prevent evasion of taxes. Nationstates and transnational agencies have also developed joint frameworks, treaties and international guidelines on the formulation of transfer prices (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1979, 2009; European Commission, 2004; Eden et al., 2001) . Faced with a squeeze on budgets and concerns about social and political stability some states are showing greater interest in scrutinising the effect of transfer pricing on corporate taxes (Hansard, UK House of Commons Debates, 6 Jul 2006 , col. 1258 US Government Accountability Office, 2004) . Some have sought to curb abuses by imposing higher financial penalties and by beefing up audit and enforcement requirements (Williamson et al., 2001; Eden at al., 2005) . Corporate executives acknowledge that -the likelihood of being challenged by tax authorities on their transfer pricing [practices] was increasing‖ (Henderson Global Investors, 2005a, p. 4 ) and a number of companies are facing lawsuits from the tax authorities and have been persuaded to make financial settlements. The UK authorities made transfer pricing adjustment to 1,724 tax computations in 2005-2006 and [unknown] In response to the uncertainty and risk to which corporations are exposed by transfer pricing, in almost all countries, there are possibilities of avoiding protracted disputes with tax authorities through ‗Advance Pricing Agreements' (APA). These permit corporations and domestic and foreign tax authorities to agree on transfer pricing methods in advance of filing a tax return and thus avoiding considerable uncertainties and possible lawsuits (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001, 2009; US Internal Revenue Service, 2007) . For confidentiality reasons, tax authorities are unwilling to publish details, but some available evidence suggests that relatively few agreements (For UK evidence see Appendix 1) are entered into (Williamson et al., 2001) . In turn, this suggests that corporations are inclined to regard the area of transfer pricing as sufficiently complex, fluid and still weakly regulated terrain where detection is low and transgression is calculated as an acceptable business risk. 3 Transfer pricing is a well-established topic in accounting textbooks, but the use of transfer pricing 4 to avoid taxes and shift capital has attracted little sustained interest (Sikka et al., 2007) . The bourgeoning corporate social responsibility literature is largely silent on the role of transfer pricing in tax avoidance and the flight of capital (Christensen and Murphy, 2004) . A considerable body of literature draws attention to the economic theories underlying transfer pricing (e.g. Hirshleifer, 1956; AbdelKhalik and Lusk, 1974; Plasschaert, 1994) , organizational processes (for example, Cools, Emmanuel and Jorissen, 2008) and income shifting tendencies (for example, Harris, 1993; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993; Jacob, 1996; Oyelere and Emmanuel, 1998; Emmanuel, 1999; Smith 2002) , but comparatively little attention is paid to what might be termed the ‗politics' of transfer pricing. There are few illustrations of the pricing strategies used by companies.
This paper seeks to draw attention to the dark side of transfer pricing by examining its role in relation to struggles over the distribution of economic surplus. Its purpose is not to advance an alternative theory of transfer pricing, or offer interpretation of complex legislation and the case law relating to it, or even to develop some new conceptual categories for its analysis. Its more modest ambition is to intensify attention to a key area of accounting practice and policy that is largely invisible to students of accounting and of seemingly low priority to the media, politicians, regulators and corporate critics. It relies upon publicly available information to provide illustrations of transfer pricing practices. The paper is organised in three further sections. The next section locates transfer pricing decisions within the dynamics of capitalism to develop a framework for understanding its role in conflicts over resource allocation. The second section presents some evidence to show that transfer pricing practices are implicated in tax avoidance and the flight of capital, both in developing and developed economies. A third and final section summarises the paper and attends to the broader social relevance of transfer pricing policies.
A Perspective on Transfer Pricing
Corporations dominate the contemporary economic, political and social landscape of most nations (Korten, 2001; Monbiot, 2000; Klein, 2001 To this end, companies sharpen their competitive advantage by developing new products, services and niches and also squeeze a variety of stakeholders to deliver and increase shareholder value (Kennedy, 2000) . Extensive use of financial engineering has been embraced to improve corporate earnings. As Froud et al. (2000) put it, -even in blue-chip companies, whose management once built factories and market share, operating management becomes an endless series of cheap financial dodges: this year's target is met by ending the defined benefit pension scheme, which saves labour costs, and next year's dodge is leasing the trucks so that capital appears in someone else's balance sheet. This work is punctuated by and interrupted by major restructurings and changes to ownership where it is financial engineering which is crucial...‖ (p. 109). In this context, taxation is targeted by financial engineers who regard it as an avoidable cost, rather than a return to society on the investment of social capital (education, security, healthcare, legal system, etc.) and a contribution to society for investment in social infrastructure.
Accounting firms are on hand to assist in the development and legitimation of tax avoidance measures (KPMG, 2004 (KPMG, , 2009a (KPMG, , 2009b Deloitte and Touche, 2007) .
Rather than portraying tax as a contribution to social development and a return on investment made by society to facilitate business activity, an Ernst & Young argued that -Tax is a cost of doing business so, naturally, a good manager will try to manage this cost and the risks associated with it‖ (Irish Times, 7 May 2004) and -Companies are constantly looking to save costs, and tax is a major cost‖ (New York Times 5 , 7
April 2009). Specifically, Deloitte & Touche advise that by -engaging in transfer pricing planning from day one rather than waiting until the tax holiday ends, the … company and its multinational group may be able to take advantage of the tax holiday to shift a supportable level of profit to … reduce the multinational group's worldwide tax cost‖ (Deloitte & Touche, 2007, p. 14) . Reducing or eliminating taxes is attractive to corporations as it boosts shareholder value, post-tax earnings and returns to shareholders. It also increases company dividends and executive rewards as these are linked to reported earnings. Since the amount of tax payable is dependent on ‗costs'
and ‗income', corporate attention becomes more intently focused on ‗transfer pricing' strategies. As a consequence of their implications for taxation, transfer prices are significant not only for the evaluation of performance of corporate divisions, subunits, departments and subsidiaries, but also for the taxes that domestic and foreign governments might be able to levy on corporate profits to finance public goods and social investment.
Often the seeds of some of the transfer pricing games are sown by the contradictory policies of the neoliberal state. For ideological reasons the state has been largely excluded from direct involvement in capitalist production and plays a minor role in directing investment of private capital. At the same time, political processes have encouraged the belief that the state can meet popular demands, provide social welfare, make investments in social infrastructures and deliver public goods (Offe, 1984) . The necessary revenues are derived from taxation based on wages, savings, profits and consumption, which in turn depend on the activities of the private sector. Since the liberal state's revenues and its survival depends upon the long-run development of the private sector (Offe, 1984) , its policies are devised to stimulate and sustain economic growth through the expansion of capital by using a variety of contradictory measures, including subsidies, tax shelters, tax incentives and sweeteners such as export subsidies, loans, guarantees and insurances. As rational economic actors corporations exploit these opportunities to maximize their after-tax global income (Emmanuel, 1999) . Tax incentives and subsidies are often dependent upon calculations of costs and revenues, but such concepts are highly malleable and are open to competing interpretations (Buchanan and Thirlby, 1973; Berry et al., 1985) . Costs, for example, consist of a variety of components, including overhead allocations, which are arbitrary and -incorrigible‖ (Thomas, 1969 (Thomas, , 1974 . A company producing, say, furniture and movies -has incentives to devise and charge suitable transfer prices to its movies division, where this enjoys tax concessions so that it can take advantage of tax laws and secure maximum benefit for increasing its reported profits.
In response to the threat to taxation revenues posed by transfer pricing practices nation-states have entered into a variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements to improve regulations (Picciotto, 1992a (Picciotto, , 1992b European Commission, 2004; OECD, 2001 OECD, , 2009 (Borkowski, 1997) , but their ability to check aggressive practices is often handicapped by the lack of financial resources and consequently the possibilities of hiring expert labour to scrutinise corporate practices more closely (Plasschaert, 1985; Christian-Aid, 2008) .
Against the background of considerable corporate discretion, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) states that globalisation of trade creates -problems for national tax authorities deriving from the potential use and abuse of "transfer prices" by the multinationals, including on loans, the allocation of fixed costs, and the valuation of trademarks and patents. Many tax administrators believe that some of these enterprises manipulate these prices to move profits from jurisdictions with high tax to those with low rates‖ (Tanzi, 2000, p. 10) . Evidence suggests that -intrafirm trade prices appear to be influenced by the tax-minimization strategies of multinational firms‖ (Clausing, 2003 (Clausing, , p. 2222 and that there is a tendency for corporations to boost post-tax earnings by reporting -higher taxable profits in countries where taxes are lower‖ (The Economist, 29 January 2004). The finance director of BMW has publicly stated that -his corporation tried to shift costs to where taxes are highest‖ (cited in Weichenrieder, 1996, p. 38 ).
The power of corporations is also strengthened in that under the ideologies of capitalism, nation-states compete to attract investment funds to stimulate domestic economies. Such competition creates opportunities for corporations to devise transfer pricing policies to take advantage of tax differentials and effectively play-off one nation-state against another. More-over, the possibilities of transfer pricing are increasingly shaped by the emergence of microstates, commonly known as offshore financial centres or tax havens, that have been described as -the cornerstone of the process of globalization‖ (Palan et al., 1996, p. 180) . The microstates 12 have used their sovereign legislative powers to preserve secrecy, provide light regulation and impose low/no tax which attract companies seeking to set-up skeletal administrative structures (Sikka, 2003) . The secrecy provides spaces to park transactions in shell corporations and engage in creative transfer pricing schemes that bear little resemblance to any arm's length price (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Bhat, 2009 ). These offshore structures permit companies to book and route their transactions so as to avoid taxes in many countries (Mitchell et al., 2002 ; also see United Nations
Economic and Social Council, 2001). Remarkably, almost half of all world trade appears to pass through offshore financial centres, even though these jurisdictions account for only about 3% of global GDP (Christensen et al., 2005, p. 67 ).
Microstates account for 1.2% of world population, but 26% of the assets and 31% of the net profits of American multinational corporations are located in these tax havens (Hines and Rice, 1994) . Some 3,600 major US corporations are known to be sheltering in the US Virgin Islands and Barbados alone (Rugman, 2000, pp. 22-23) . It is estimated that some US$11.5 trillion of assets reside in offshore havens (The Observer, 27 March 2005) . Each year some 200,000 new companies 13 are formed in microstate havens and the cumulative numbers could be more than three million (Baker, 2005) . The British Virgin Islands has 3,389 companies per 100 head of population and Caymans has 182 companies per 100 people (Meinzer, 2009 
Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: Some Evidence
This section provides some evidence of the use of transfer pricing in both emerging and developed economies.
Emerging and Transitional Economies
China is widely regarded as an emerging economic superpower. Its recent export-led economic growth of over 10% per annum has been fuelled by foreign direct investment (FDI) interacting with cheap labour and indigenous technology to produce an export-led boom. The Chinese government continues to develop sophisticated property rights, land and foreign investment protection laws (e.g. relating to bankruptcy 14 , patents, trade marks) and has sought to attract FDI by offering a variety of tax incentives and concessions to foreign corporations (Chan and Chow, 1997; Moser, 1999; Sun 1999; Ho and Lau, 2002) . Incentives and concessions have included a two-year tax holiday starting with the first profit-making year and a 50% tax reduction for the following three years. Foreign corporations investing in high technology industries and low profit industries, such as agriculture and forestry, have qualified for tax holidays for two further years. Foreign corporations investing in special economic zones have benefited from considerably lower tax rates (15% compared to the normal rate of 33%). Some provinces and cities have also offered a variety of tax inducements and subsidies (e.g. lower land using fees). To support its domestic economy, the government has restricted foreign companies' access to some domestic markets, retained some foreign exchange controls and levied a withholding tax on profit repatriation. In addition, China's currency is not fully floated on the foreign exchanges and its value is primarily fixed by the government rather than the markets.
The Chinese economic boom and tax incentives have created profitable business opportunities. In 1980, FDI was only US$57 million but reached US$35. 8 billion in 1995 8 billion in (UNCTAD, 2003 . By the late 1990s, some 140,000 foreign investment enterprises were operating in China. At this time around 54%, 63% and 70% of the foreign investment enterprises reported operating losses of US$7.1 billion to the tax authorities for the years 1993 , 1994 and 1995 , respectively (Ho and Lau, 2002 ). The Several studies have identified the creative use of transfer prices, especially the adjustment of import and export prices that shifts profits from China to more desirable locations. In a study of the automotive industry, Wang (2001) concluded that by -quoting a higher-than-market price on equipment …….. parts and raw materials, foreign firms may be able to by-pass the various regulations on the repatriation of profits, and finally may understate the level of domestic earnings‖ (p.6). Moreover, since joint ventures rely on purchase of components and technologies from parent companies, -foreign investors intend to prolong the purchase period to maximise the profits generated from transfer pricing‖ (Wang, 2001, p. 11) . One study estimates that
Chinese exports by multinational corporations are underpriced by an average of 17% whilst imports are overpriced by an average of 9% (Sun, 1999 (Gunter, 2004) .
Russia, another emerging economy, also provides evidence of the impact of transfer pricing practices. Following the collapse of communism, the Russian economy suffered considerable decline. There was a reduction in GDP of -14%, -8.7%, -12.7%, -4.2% and -3.6% respectively for the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996, representing a drop of around 42% in the country's output (Bush, 2003) . Compared to China, the level of FDI has, until recently, been comparatively low. The cumulative visibility by the trade in oil and gas which are major contributors to the Russian economy 21 (Ahrend, 2004) . In early 2004, a World Bank report stated that the country's oil and gas exports accounted for 25% of the country's GDP rather than 9%
reported in the official data (Financial Times, 19 February 2004) . The major reason for the discrepancy was that corporations exploited a variety of -tax loopholes, engaged in transfer pricing -including creating a series of on and off-shore trading companies to purchase oil at low cost from production sites and then sell it back again through intermediaries‖ (The Globalist, 1 December 2004). World Bank officials state that -many large Russian firms benefit from transfer pricing by employing trading companies to avoid taxation. Companies sell their products to trading subsidiaries at below-market prices; these trading subsidiaries then sell the product to the end customer at market prices and pocket the difference ….. typically shell companies are registered in remote regions ….
[some] simply disappear soon after they have concluded as many transactions with end customer as possible‖. (Ruehl and Schaffer, 2004) . For example, Russian oil priced for sale internally at US$10 a metric ton was sold to an exporter's foreign subsidiary at $10 a metric ton and then resold to foreign buyers at the market price of US$120 a metric ton, with the profits being booked and retained at external companies (Baker, 2005, p. 152) . A report by the Russia's Audit
Chamber noted that 80% of the coal exported from Russia is sold through offshore entities. The trading companies registered offshore accumulate significant coal revenues as Russian producers sell to them at a discount of 30-54% to global prices (Bloomberg, 11 July 2009). As a result companies avoid taxes because profits are not booked in Russia.
Russian gas company Gazprom created Itera, an affiliated company based in Jacksonville, USA. It has been claimed that gas with a Russian domestic price of $2 to $4 per thousand cubic meters has been sold at that price to the US which Itera then resold to Russian republics at between US$30 to US$90 per thousand cubic meters, with the profits being retained in the US (Baker, 2005, p. 156; Browder, 2002 (Komisar, 2005; Clateman, 2005a Clateman, , 2005b Clateman, , 2006 Tanega and Gololobov (2007) . Allegedly, these schemes enabled Yukos and its Transfer pricing practices continue to pose challenges to developing countries keen to attract investment from multinational corporations (UNCTAD, 1999a, 199b) Due to transfer pricing practices of multinational companies, Papua New Guinea is estimated to have lost tax revenues of between $9 million and $$17 million, in 1999, on its forestry business alone, which far exceeds the country's education and healthcare budgets (Hunt, 2002) . More recent estimates suggest that it may be losing $100 million of tax revenues a year because of the transfer pricing policies of international timber companies (Forest Trends, 2006) . A key strategy is that the -logging companies are grossly understating the value of timber exported ….. timber exports are laundered through the overseas subsidiaries of companies exporting the timber. Importers buy the timber from the subsidiaries at much higher prices than those declared to the PNG [Papua New Guinea] tax office at the point of export‖ (The Australian, 20 July 2006). More widely, transfer pricing has been used by multinational logging companies to avoid payment of taxes that could otherwise provide citizens in developing countries with revenues vital for their economic development (Dauvergne, 1998) .
Developed and Advanced Economies
Transfer pricing issues also pose challenges to more developed economies. By examining the US customs data and filings of import and export prices used by corporations, Pak and Zdanowicz (2002) proprietary products to move revenues and relocate profits. The pharmaceutical companies widely known for the same practice were invoicing as much as 10 times or more for the same product sold to one subsidiary out of which profits were drawn as compared to another subsidiary where profits were permitted to remain‖ (Baker, 2005, p. 170) . In evidence to the US Senate Finance Committee, the Commissioner of the US Inland Revenue Service (IRS) stated that -taxpayers shift significant profits offshore by manipulating the price of related-party transactions so that the income of an economic group is earned in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions, rather than the U.S., The transfer prices of another major pharmaceutical company, SmithKline, came under scrutiny by the Canadian tax authorities (Turner, 1996; McMechan, 2004) . For the years 1980 to 1989, the authorities challenged the company's pricing practices for cimetidine, an active ingredient used in the manufacture of the drug Tagamet.
SmithKline formulated, packaged and distributed the drug and earned considerable profits in Canada. However, under an agreement made in 1977, the company purchased its key ingredient (which was under patent protection) at $400 per kilogram from its offshore affiliates located in low-tax jurisdictions, the Bahamas and Ireland.
In the early 1980s, generic forms of the ingredient became available at prices ranging from $50 to $250 per kilogram and this reduced the market price of the drug. There is nothing unusual about multinational corporations purchasing or creating and then holding intellectual property in low-tax jurisdictions and charging other group members royalties for using the same (Pritchard, 2001 ). The advantage is that subsidiaries and affiliates can claim tax relief on costs whilst the recipient pays little or no tax on the income. Nestlé, a multinational food company, conducts Westreco for all salaries, rent, consulting fees, raw materials, equipment, and administrative expenses, but not taxes, plus a percentage mark-up. The US tax authorities argued that the mark-up was too low and effectively enabled the US subsidiary to shift income and avoid US taxes. In this case, the court (Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1992 32 ) sided with Nestlé.
Companies do not necessarily have to transact internationally to develop transfer pricing policies for the use of intellectual property. For example, the federal structure of the US has permitted places such as Delaware and Nevada to offer lower tax rates or special provisions for income from intangible assets. Forsberg (2003) explains that in accordance with well-established legal procedures a parent company transfers its trade names, patents or trademarks to another subsidiary in, say, Delaware and then pays a fee to the Delaware company in return for the use of the name or mark. Often the subsidiary companies do not produce anything tangible and have little or no staffing. Such activity reduces the parent company's income and tax in the place of its business, as the fee is a deductible business expense 33 . Geoffrey Inc. is incorporated in
Delaware and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Toys "R" Us, a global company incorporated in the US state of New Jersey. For example, Geoffrey Inc. owns several trademarks -including Geoffrey, the Toys "R" Us giraffe -and trade names (including Toys "R" Us). Toys "R" Us pays royalties to Delaware-based Geoffrey Inc. to use the trademark and trade name. The tax impact of this is to reduce Toys "R" Us's taxable income in places where royalty payments are tax deductible, and shift it to Delaware, which does not tax royalty income.
Summary and Discussion
This paper has sought to draw attention to the role of transfer pricing in facilitating tax avoidance. By collecting together some of the scattered evidence of the nature and extent of scope of transfer pricing in relation to tax avoidance it has sought to give greater visibility to the role of transfer pricing in transferring wealth. This paper has endeavoured to show how transfer pricing is not just an accounting technique, but also a method of resource allocation and avoidance of taxes that affects distribution of income, wealth, risks and quality of life. By shedding some light upon the dark side of transfer pricing, our intention has been to stimulate a closer and more critical consideration of the ramifications of transfer pricing practices, and thereby encourage more informed consideration of how these might be regulated in a more socially attentive and responsible manner.
Recent years have seen considerable decline in the headline rates of corporation tax (KPMG, 2009) , but this does not appear to have checked the corporate desire to avoid taxes. In more advanced economies, despite record profits, the tax revenues from corporate taxes as a percentage of the GDP and effective tax rates have declined, and transfer pricing practices may provide a plausible explanation for this decline (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005; KPMG, 2009b) . As rational economic actors companies OECD, 1979) or as having -no direct effect on the entire company's reported profit‖ (Garrison et al., 2005, p. 654 ) is problematic or, at best, aspirational , as in practice, it can enable companies to report higher earnings to appease stock markets and maximize executive remuneration, but the loss of tax revenues curtails the ability of the state to provide public goods and alleviate poverty.
Faced with corporate resistance some states may assign higher rates of taxes to wages, consumption, savings and less mobile capital, which in turn can breed resentment and undermine the social legitimacy of the state. Thus transfer pricing is at the heart of the debates about legitimacy of the state, social responsibility and accountability of corporations.
Globalization has encouraged convergence around the arm's length principle, but public goods. Seemingly, transfer pricing is taught without any consideration of its social and political context and its capacity to transfer wealth through tax avoidance (Tippett and Wright, 2006; Sikka et al., 2007) . In contrast, we have placed transfer pricing at the heart of conflicts over the allocation of resources that involve corporations, stock markets, company executives, business advisers and the state.
Transfer pricing practices, we have argued, merit close attention because they articulate competing claims on economic surpluses in the shape of corporate earnings, rates of return, dividends, executive rewards, taxes, social welfare rights and the ability of states to provide public goods.
Some of the literature urges nation-states to eliminate tax differentials in the hope that this would check the tendency to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions (Borkowski, 1997 (Picciotto, 1992a; Mintz, 1998; Avi-Yonah and Clausing, 2007 banks) but by also providing social infrastructure, security, legal system and social stability conducive to the production of economic surpluses. Such activities can only be financed through collection of adequate tax revenues, but the net effect of many corporate transfer pricing strategies is to deprive the state of the tax revenues and undermine its ability to provide public goods and an environment conducive to smooth accumulation of economic surpluses. Thus the politics of transfer pricing draw attention to the complex and contradictory role of the state and corporations in the recurring crisis of capitalism. 
APPENDIX 1 Advanced Pricing Agreements in the UK

NOTES
1 In textbooks (e.g. Horngren et al., 2002; Atkinson, Kaplan and Young, 2004) ‗transfer pricing' is commonly understood as the price that a company charges for a product, service, loan and the use of intangibles to a related organisation, including a division, subsidiary, affiliate or a joint venture. It acts as a device for allocation of costs, income, revenues and profits to various subunits. Traditional views conjure up images of transfer prices in relation to tangible goods and services. Yet, in a world where executives are under pressure to produce higher shareholder value, transfer prices, and the associated opportunities to construct them in tax-minimising manner, may cover leasing, intellectual property, royalties, interest payments, expenses, fees, management charges, advisory services and virtually everything that a company can buy or sell. 2 There are perennial debates about the meaning and significance of ‗tax avoidance' and ‗tax evasion'. Generally, tax avoidance is considered to be lawful and tax evasion is used to describe practices that contravene the law. However, in practice the distinction is often blurred. Often, some strategies have been argued to be ‗avoidance', but when challenged and scrutinized in courts they have been found to be ‗evasion'. On occasions, companies have structured transactions which have little/no economic substance, but enable companies to reduce their tax liabilities. On moral and ethical grounds, some have objected to such practices (Christian-Aid, 2008 , especially as the loss of tax revenues has negative effect on the provision of public goods, security, alleviation of poverty and social stability. 3 The counterargument, with which we have little sympathy, is that because international corporations are well resourced to negotiate with tax authorities they have become a ‗soft target' for over-zealous tax authorities. Accordingly, it is argued that companies may be investigated for the years preceding entry into APAs and that -tax probes can catch companies unawares and can be very intrusive and expensive…while the protection of national interests is a legitimate claim, the interpretation and enforcement of an ever changing and complex transfer pricing legislation can be uneven and sometimes too prejudiced and Machiavellian' (Mehafdi, 2000: 376) . Compared to systematic manipulation of transfer pricing, evidence of such cases is scant, and many developing countries lack resources for effective audits of transfer pricing practices of multinational companies. 4 Transfer prices can also provide a cover for illicit and anti-social corporate behaviour (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1976, paras 51-59). 5 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/business/global/08tax.html?pagewanted=1&_r= 1&sq=tax&st=nyt&scp=2; accessed 7 April 2009. 6 According to the OECD guidelines this is taken to mean that a transfer price should be the same as if the two companies involved were indeed two independents, not part of the same corporate structure. The OECD Model Tax Convention is considered to be the framework for bilateral treaties between OECD countries, and is also adopted by many non-OECD governments 7 Therefore companies and tax authorities use a variety of proxies, such as cost Plus, Resale Price, Profit Split , comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), resale price method (RPM), cost plus method (CPM), Profit split method (PSM) and Transactional net margin method (TNM) to estimate transfer prices. The Delaware company may then lend the money back to the parent company or send it back in the form of dividends to achieve more tax advantages for the parent. The interest that the parent pays on the loan is an expense that can be deducted from net income, thus reducing taxes further. The dividends that the parent receives back from the Delaware corporation do not have to be recognized by the parent as taxable income. In either case, the parent corporation has successfully transferred income earned in one jurisdiction into tax-free income that it can use without restriction. 34 http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14292573?f=most_read; accessed 18 September 2009.
